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AN EVOLUTIONARY CONSIDERATION OF THE
MARRIAGE FORMALITIES OF LICENSURE
AND SOLEMNIZATION
AS MANIFESTED IN CONTEMPORARY
ENGLISH AND NORTH CAROLINIAN STATUTORY LAW
DONALD A. POWELL*
I would be married, but I'd have no
wife,
I would be married to a single life!'
PREFACE
It is the intention of this paper to explore the evolutionary ramifications of
the marriage formalities of solemnization and licensure as manifested in
contemporary English and North Carolinian statutory law. This study runs
the full gamut from the early Dark Ages on the Continent, through the latter
Middle Ages in England and the Continent, the growth of an indigenous
English law separate and apart from its Continental heritage, its migration
to proprietary and colonial North Carolina, the subsequent mutation thereof
and development of an indigenous North Carolinian law, to the present day
statutory scheme in England and North Carolina.
As is proper in such an undertaking, an attempt has been made to
analyze the status of the licensure and solemnization prescriptions with
respect to the generally accepted "turning points" in history, e.g., the Coun-
cil of Trent, the founding of the colonies, American Independence, etc. In
addition, an attempt has been made to appreciate the underlying social,
political and economic variables at each such milepost in relation to their
respective legal developments.
This study is primarily an historical meditation rather than an examina-
tion of topical English and North Carolinian law and is, ergo, comparative in
that sense only. The crux of the analysis then, is not an in-depth commentary
on the laws themselves, but is, more precisely, an effort to disinter the
compelling motives for such pronouncements, to see their faults and short-
comings, to understand the receptions given them by the people and, lastly,
to impress upon the reader a sincere appreciation of tonal heritage in statu-
tory law.
* Associate, Moss, Powell and Powers, P.A.. Moorestown, New Jersey- B.A., University of
Scranton (1974); J.D.. Rutgers University (1977).
I. R. CRASHAW. STEPS TO TilE TEMPLE (1648).
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THE EARLY CONTINENTAL PERIOD: 476-1000
The fall of Rome is formally attributed by most historians to Odoacer's
deposing of Romulus Augustulus, the last emperor in the West, in 476 A.D.IA
The wake which followed has habitually been categorized as the Dark Ages of
Europe. Such was an age in which cultural progress was almost impossible.
Centralization, critical to the development of legal and social orders, was
lacking. The reign of Charles Magnus, ceremoniously commencing in
800 A.D. and admittedly fostering a "Renaissance" in Europe, was but a brief
respite to the continued decay of order and culture, and upon his death the
empire again divided. Feudalism, that is, decentralization, again set in.
The attacks of the Norsemen, the Saracens and the Mongols, destroying the
centers of wealth and culture, effectively denied maturity to the fruits of
the Carolinian Renaissance.
As is ordinarily the case in a decentralized society, an obtaining legal sys-
tem is largely non-existent, such inference being drawn in retrospect from
that society's failure to make a bequeathal to the annals of history. Sub-
sequent generations of students are thereby left little choice but to speculate
as to the modus operandi of mundane endeavors and occurrences. This,
broadly speaking, is the general framework of our historical understanding
of the legal systems of the early continental period, and hence our legacy
with respect to matrimonial formalities in particular.
It is generally accepted that the early Christians treated marriage as a
civil contract, yielding perhaps to the Roman Law prevailing at the time.2
And in its early development, the Canon Law was not able to shake such a
conceptualization, as it was relatively simple for the inhabitants of the Dark
Ages to flout the law in such a stagnant society. Accordingly, notorious con-
cubinage and multiple marriages were quite common.3
Hence, among the Germanic tribes who peopled Europe after the fall of
Rome, the term "marriage" was largely an empirical conception. The term
itself had no restricted legal meaning. So long as it endured, a relationship of
life between a man and a woman was properly called a "marriage" whether
the relationship commenced and continued in accordance with law or
custom, or not.
4
As far as actual formalities were concerned, the newly wedded couples
of the early Middle Ages, according to some authorities, formalized their
marriages and rendered them binding between themselves and the rest of
IA. 15 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, Roman Empire 389 (1960).
2. 2 J. SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1190 (6th ed.
1921) [hereinafter cited as J. SCHOULER].
3. R. DELORT, LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 107 (R. Allen trans. 1973) [hereinafter cited as R.
DELORT].
4. Engdahl, Medieval Metaphisics and English Marriage Law, 8 J. FAMILY L. 381, 382-383
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Engdahl].
5. Stein, Common-Law Marriage: Its Histor' and Certain ContemporarY Problems, 9
J. FAMILY L. 271, 271 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Stein].
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the world merely by going to bed together in the presence of witnesses.5 The
lack of historical data renders it fruitless to ascertain precisely whether this
was in fact the case. In accord with the mores of those times, it is probably
safe to say that there were no licensure or solemnization requirements. It
nevertheless remains difficult to surmise so in terms of particularity.
In other words, was mere going to bed in the presence of witnesses the
extent of the solemnization? Were words of present or future intent re-
quired to be spoken? Was an intent required to be manifested in some em-
pirical way? Was the presence of clergy or lay authority necessary? As the
general rule accepted by historians is that "any form" was a valid form, 6 the
concept of a requisite formality becomes purely academic, as a decentral-
ized society knows no sanctions. The argument then, that there were no re-
quired formalities, becomes a tenable position. Such a contention is all the
more plausible inasmuch as the earliest uniform law concerning marriage in
Europe was the Canon Law promulgated by the Roman Catholic Church.7
The Canon Law required an inward exchange of mutual consent, but such
law was generally not cognizable until the seventh century at the earliest.8
Furthermore, the terms per verba de praesenti and per verba de futuro cum
copula did not appear in common parlance until the rise of the ecclesiastical
authorities (e.g., Lombard and Aquinas) during the latter years of the Middle
Ages, approximately 1000-1300. 9 The Canon Law, eventually identical from
Scotland to Cyprus, Portugal to Palestine, and the major unifying factor
of the Western World, was slowly elaborated through centuries and did not
attain a definite form until the eleventh and twelfth centuries.' 0
Hence, the picture presented by the early continental period is, at best,
incomplete. Licensure was not required, as the populace was anything but
literate. The existence of actual solemnization requirements is unclear, as
there apparently was no centralized authority to promulgate them. That no
outwardly visible solemnization was required is in all probability an accurate
assessment. Whether some inward form, e.g., words of consent, was re-
quired is at best, pure conjecture. Neither the legal nor the ecclesiastical
structures were securely lodged on the continent at that time.
CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT FROM THE LATTER MIDDLE AGES
UP TO THE COUNCIL OF TRENT: 1000-1545
As previously indicated, the earliest uniform law concerning marriage in
Europe was the Canon Law promulgated by the Roman Catholic Church."
6. Barry, The Tridentine Form of Marriage: Is the Law Unreasonable?, 20 JURIST 159, 161
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Barry].
7. Stein, supra note 5.
8. 0. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE 14-15 (1922) [hereinafter cited as 0. KOEGEL].
9. Maitland, Magistri Vacarii Summa de Matrimonio, in SELECTED ESSAYS on FAMILY LAW
104 (Comm. of the Assoc. of Am. L. Schools ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as Maitland]
10. DELORT, supra note 3, at 125.
II. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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While the earliest influences of such law can be traced back as far as the seventh
century, 2 it was not until the twelfth century that the Church throughout the
Western World was able to successfully claim for her courts an exclusive right
to pronounce on the validity of marriages. 3 It was at this time that the canonical
formalities of marriage first appeared, although they were restricted to an in-
ward form of solemnization only and did not embrace licensure at all. 14
Renewed acquaintance with the literature of classical Greece and Rome dur-
ing the eleventh and twelfth centuries had stirred the ecclesiastical interest in
problems of philosophy, in particular the dialectic and the ontological. The in-
escapable supernaturalism of the orthodox faith predisposed Christian
philosophy toward metaphysics. Metaphysics then became inextricably en-
sconced in the Canon Law of marriage. 5 This was the age of Aquinas and
Anselm and other doctors of the early Western Church. It was an age character-
ized by a movement away from the Platonic theory of forms and an eager em-
bracement of a newly resurrected Aristotelian philosophy.
Marriage was quickly losing its empirical notions and was coming to be
viewed as a metaphysical bond. 16 Falling back on the Christian scriptures for
supporting a metaphysical conceptualization of marriage, the ecclesiastical
authorities now considered husband and wife as "two in one flesh."'1 7 The upshot
of such an abstraction was that inasmuch as there could be no marriage without
a metaphysical bond, it then became necessary for someone to create that bond.
And so, the Canons came to require an inward exchange of mutual consent per
verba de praesenti as requisite to a valid marriage. Thus did the demise of the
Germanic empiricism come about. This is the first formal solemnization require-
ment of the Western Church. If this was lacking, not only was the marriage
illegal, but also, and for the first time, the marriage was invalid, i.e., there was no
marriage at all. Hence, merely living together did not, as before, constitute a
marriage. Furthermore, where there was a valid marriage, merely separating the
parties physically could not and did not annul, as before, the marriage. 8
This formal requirement of an inward exchange of consent gave rise to the
famous classification of contracts per verba depraesenti and per verba defuturo
cum copula, the distinction which historically has been attributed to Peter
Lombard, a professor at the University of Paris and later an ordained bishop. 9
Briefly, the classification recognized two forms of marriage. The former was a
marriage created by an inward exchange of consent expressed in words of
present tense without any need for witnesses, banns, ceremony or physical con-
summation. The latter was an initial promise, again without any need for wit-
nesses, banns, or ceremony, to become husband and wife at some future time,
12. See note.8 supra and accompanying text.
13. Maitland, supra note 9.
14. See Stein, supra note 5, at 273.
15. Engdahl, supra note 4, at 391.
16. Id. at 392.
17. Id. at 391. See also Genesis 2:23; Ephesians 5:31; St. Matthew 19:4,6; Mark 10:8,9.
18. Engdahl, supra note 4, at 392.
19. 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 15.
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the promise to ripen into an actual marriage after sexual intercourse. The act of
intercourse was presumed to change the prior words of future intent into words
of present consent. 20 But mere sponsalia per verba defuturo did not create a
marriage and gave rise to no change of status unless followed by consum-
mation. 21
The Church really had but little choice but to accept Lombard's contention
that a marriage per verba de praesenti without a physical consummation was
valid, for it was the only way to explain the existence of a valid marriage between
St. Mary and St. Joseph. 22
The classic case is Richard de Anesty's case, decided in 1143 A.D. in a decretal
of Pope Alexander Ill addressed to the Bishop of Norwich, in the reign of Henry
1I. In that case a "marriage" solemnly celebrated in Church, a "marriage" of
which a child had been born, was set aside as null in favor of an earlier marriage
constituted by a mere exchange of words without carnal knowledge, witnesses,
banns or ceremony. 23
Although a precise date for the earliest instance of the Church's requirement
of mutual consent cannot definitively be established, the decretal of Pope
Alexander III in 1143 clearly predates the Council of Trent, 1545-1563. As the
form of the consent is juridical in that if it is defective there is no marriage at all,
it is respectfully submitted that it is improper for some authorities to state that
there was, prior to Trent, merely a liturgical form of marriage in the Church
and not an obligatory juridical form. 24
The problem with the pre-Trent marriage was not that there was no juridical
form, because there was, but rather that the Church recognized private or
clandestine marriages as valid, 25 in which the juridical requirement of a mere
inward exchange of consent was often difficult to prove. 26 Hence, until 1563 the
validity or invalidity of a given marriage could easily be a secret known only to
the parties themselves. It was well nigh impossible for the Church to know if a
party was lying. 27 Many injustices thereby obtained. Frequently a man went
through such a clandestine marriage and then tired of his wife. He then con-
tracted a "new marriage" with someone else in full public solemnity. The result
was that the first was his true wife, yet the Church was forced to accept the sec-
ond as his true wife. 28
20. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 367-372 (2d ed. 1898).
21. Andrews, The Common Law Marriage, 22 MODERN L. REV. 396 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Andrews].
22. Maitland, supra note 9, at 107.
23. 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 20.
24. Brown, The Relation of Theology and Philosophy to the Forms of Marriage. I J. FAMILY L.
126, 128 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
25. M. Sheehan, The Formation and Stability of Marriage in Fourteenth-Century England: Evi-
dence of an El' Register, in 33 MEDIEVAL STUDIES 228-264 (1971).
26. See Barry, supra note 6.
27. Chatham, Evolution of the Juridical Form of Marriage in the Latin Rite, 16JURIST298, 299
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Chatham].
28. Barry, supra note 6, at 162.
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True, from a religious consideration marriages unblessed by the Church were
condemned, and the parties often compelled by spiritual censures to celebrate
their marriage infacie Ecclesiae. In fact, many, but not a substantial number, of
marriages were ordinarily entered into with a public ceremony in facie
Ecclesiae. Yet such religious sanctions however, were not necessary to render the
marriage valid in a juridical sense, as the mutual consent, if already existing, had
rendered the marriage valid ab initio, notwithstanding its clandestinity. 29
Of course many of the regional ecclesiastics were most unhappy with clandes-
tine marriages and a few took matters into their own hands. In the year 1200,
Archbishop Hubert Walter, at the Council of Lambeth, demanded triple publi-
cation of banns and a "proper ceremony" in facie Ecclesiae30 as requisite for-
malities to a valid marriage. At first, it was highly questionable whether such a
decree had the full imprimatur of the Bishop of Rome and was therefore juridi-
cally cognizable. That it was not, was underscored by the subsequent Lateran
Council of 1215. There, Pope Innocent III, while decreeing that all marriages
henceforth were to be solemnized in facie Ecclesiae after due publication of
banns, further decreed that such was merely directory, i.e., liturgical and not
juridical. Those who ignored the directory were censured, but the validity of
their marriage remained unaffected. 31
DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLAND: 476-1200
Integral to traditional English and American law is the notion of validity. 32 It
was this natural, empirical conception of marriage which the Germanic tribes
brought with them when they invaded the Roman province of Britannia in the
fifth and sixth centuries.3 3 Displacing the existing Roman civilization, it was the
Germanic, not the Roman traditions, which formed the basis of the early Anglo-
Saxon law of marriage. 34
It may reasonably be inferred that early, i.e., 476 A.D., Anglo-Saxon marriage
formalities were largely identical to those of the continental period following the
fall of Romulus Augustulus. And those crude empirical concepts formed the
foundation of the Anglo-Saxon law of marriage. Although licensure, in all
probability, was not required, the existence of the requirement of solemnization
is unclear, as there was also no centralized legal or ecclesiastical authority in
England at this time to promulgate such precepts. That no outwardly visible
form was required is most likely an accurate assessment. Whether some inward
form was required is, as in the case of the early continental period, merely con-
jecture.
29. J. LONG, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 56, at 92 (2d ed. 1913) [hereinafter cited as
J. LONG].
30. Stein, supra note 5, at 273.
31. Id.
32. Engdahl, supra note 4.
33. Id. at 383.
34. Id.
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Prior to the fall of Rome and the subsequent invasions of Britannia by the
Germanic tribes of northern Europe, the Roman settlements in Britain had been
Christianized, a fact that did not escape the attention of the early ecclesiastics
who were determined to reconquer the Island for the Faith. 35
In accord with the Church's plan to one day claim for her courts an exclusive
right to pronounce on the validity of a marriage, a dream come true by 1200,36
Christianity came to Britain at the end of the sixth century, Augustine, the
doctor of the Eastern Church, was sent by Pope Gregory the Great to found an
abbey and mission at Canterbury. Ecclesiastical authority immediately assumed
control over all marriages here at Canterbury, and as Germanic tribal rites
gradually came to be suppressed, the ecclesiastical Canon Law began to
permeate the entire Island,37 emanating from Canterbury which, to this day, has
remained the seat of ecclesiastical, although no longer Roman Catholic,
authority in England.
The Christian missions were hard put to stamp out the empirical German
notions of marriage, and up until the eve of the Norman Conquest of 1066,
marriage in England still exhibited the cardinal characteristics of the old Ger-
manic conceptualizations.38 It wasn't until after Hastings that the Western
Church was able to realize an appreciable surge of influx in England. Thereafter
the continental ecclesiastical Canon Law slowly infiltrated the Island, and
when William the Conqueror separated the spiritual law from the'temporal law,
the ecclesiastical courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over marriage. 39
By the year 1200 the Canon Law was firmly secured in Britain and was indis-
tinguishable from its continental heritage. The metaphysical conceptualizations
and the Church's juridical requirement of an inward exchange of mutual con-
sent, of either the de praesenti or de futuro variety, were fully cognizable in
English ecclesiastical marriage law. Thus do we know from the teachings and
records of St. Anselm, Abbot of the Norman Abbey of Bec, who crossed the
Channel in 1093 to become Archbishop of Canterbury and a strong leader in
the early church in England.40
That the so called early common law of England was, with respect to mar-
riage, identical to the continental ecclesiastical Canon Law is also the opinion of
Blackstone and emminent early English jurists.41 While marriage in solemn form
was not unknown, by this law, identical in England and Europe, a mere inward
exchange of consent, without more, was all that was juridically required to con-
stitute a valid marriage in the eyes of the Church who exercised exclusive juris-
diction over such matters in the Western World. 42
35. Id.
36. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
37. Engdahl, supra note 4, at 384.
38. Id.
39. Stein, supra note 5, at 274.
40. Engdahl, supra note 4, at 394.
41. See J. LONG, supra note 29.
42. Id.
7
Powell: An Evolutionary Consideration of the Marriage Formalities of Lice
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1978
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LA WJOURNAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLAND: 1200-1545
As previously discussed, the ecclesiastical courts in England were eventually
successful in assertingjurisdiction over the entire province of marriage, and at an
early period, to wit, 1200, the marriage law of England was the Canon Law of
the Western Church.4 3 The exclusivity of the early church in England is under-
scored by the fact that the parties to a marriage were not, until later, denied any
of the civil rights attendant to the marital relationship. King Aethelbernt (late
sixth century) refused to deny civil incidents, e.g., dower, descent of real prop-
erty, etc., to clandestine marriages which, although considered unlawful by the
Crown and censured by the Church, were nevertheless held to be valid marriages
by both.4 4 The censured parties were merely admonished that "their souls would
go to hell" which apparently, in retrospect, was an unsuccessful deterrent to
clandestine marriages. The sole exception, i.e. the case in which civil incidents
were denied, was the instance of marriage to a nun, to whom dower rights were
denied and whose child was not permitted to inherit real property.4 5
Such exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction of marriage was not destined to last,
and early in the history of England the courts of common law began to divest the
ecclesiastical courts of jurisdiction over the civil incidents of marriage. None-
theless, the temporal law, i.e. the common law, still had no doctrine for marriage
per se, and that remained the exclusive province of the ecclesiastical courts.4 6
This jurisdictional bifurcation led to much friction between the ecclesiastical
and common law courts. This division, to which there is nothing parallel in the
classical Roman Law, was of course due to the fact that medieval Christianity,
regarding marriage as a sacrament, had placed it under the exclusive control of
the Church and her tribunals in those aspects which were deemed to affect the
spiritual well-being of the parties to it.47
In practice, the common law courts soon began to ignore the decrees of the
ecclesiastical courts. While the Church insisted that marriage be relatively easy
to enter into, requiring at this point in time merely an inward exchange of mutual
consent, the common law courts, perhaps playing their cue to a rising landed
aristocracy, refused to make it equally easy to inherit or otherwise acquire title
in English soil. The common law courts, early on, consistently stated that, "The
acts which give rights in land should be public, notorious acts.14 The resilient
impetuousity of the common law courts, confirming a triumph for the landed
aristocracy, is conclusively evinced in those death bed weddings, valid marriages
43. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY& F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 172(1966)[herein-
after cited as C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER].
44. See Engdahl, supra note 4, at 385-88.
45. Id. at 388.
46. See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 43. at 173.
47. See 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 13.
48. See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 43, at 173. See also J. LoNG, supra note 29,
§ 56.
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under the common law and the ecclesiastical Canon Law, which "may do well
enough for the Church and may, one hopes, profit the sinner's soul in another
world, but [which] must give no rights in English soil." 4 9
This then, was the beginning of civil regulation of marriage in England. But
such initial regulation was essentially negative in that it affected only rights in
real property and did not disturb the validity of the marriage itself. As far as
formalities were concerned, there would be no acts passed by the Parliament un-
til Lord Hardwicke's Act in 1753, infra.
Hence, the Canon Law of the Church still governed the validity of a marriage
in England in 1545. Concerning the civil incidents, obviously more than hearsay
evidence of mutual consent was necessary before the courts of common law
would affirm the administration of an estate in land. But inasmuch as this was
solely a common law and not a statutory requirement, the formal criteria of
proof most surely varied from assizes to assizes. As a representative case, see
Haydon v. Gould, I Salk 119 (1723) which held that a marriage performed by a
layman was not sufficient to entitle the man, after the woman's death, to ad-
minister her estate. Note that the court does not decree the marriage invalid.
THE COUNCIL OF TRENT: 1545-1563
Until the Council of Trent, requisite marriage formalities were identical in
England and on the Continent, and were governed exclusively by the Canon
Law. True, the common law courts early wrested control of the civil incidents of
marriage from the ecclesiastical courts, but they declined to pronounce on the
validity of a marriage per se. Parliament declined such pronouncement until
1753, infra50
As the only juridical requirement until 1563 was that of an inward exchange of
mutual consent, the validity or invalidity of a given marriage was often a secret
known only to the parties themselves. 5' As far as the Church was concerned,
such clandestine abuses had pernicious spiritual and social repercussions. 5 2
Prior to the Council of Trent, it is an established fact that no procedure existed
for a declaration of nullity of marriage.5 3.
Viewed as a sacrament by the ecclesiastical authorities, marriage was unique
in that it was administered not by a priest or bishop but by the contracting
parties themselves. It was indubitably a desire to preserve this doctrine which
prevented the Church for fifteen hundred years from enacting a law which would
require solemnization infacie Ecclesiae as a requisite formality to the validity of
a marriage.5 4
49. W.
50. See 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 13.
51. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
52. Chatham, supra note 27, at 300.
53. Carberry, Lack of Form Marriages and Proof/or Declaration of Nullitv. 15 JIlRIST 374. 375
(1955).
54. Chatham, supra note 27.
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In the ages of faith, when there was comparative unity in the external life of
Christendom, the emphasis was on the validity of marriage as it affected the
life and conscience of the individual Christian. The age of the Council of Trent
was an age of expansionism and New World discoveries. It was the age of
Erasmus, Luther, Copernicus, Descartes and Galileo. It was a time of skepticism
and unrest. It was the beginning of a new era, of the rise of the nation states of
Europe and of the birth of modern philosophy. With the attendant disruption of
Christian unity, a viable juridical form was now necessary for the validity of a
marriage, thus making it possible for the Church to pass effectivejudgment upon
the marital status of her children. 55
In the Church's desire to curtail the widespread incidences of adultery, to
regularize cohabitation, to save the children of such unions from the stigma of
bastardy, to save the parents from the sin of fornication and to make good the
expectations of the parites at the time of their consent, 56 Catholic theology began
to teach that although consent makes a marriage under the supernatural law
(metaphysical conceptualizations, supra, inextricably ensconced in the Canon
Law), the exercise of the right of marital consent could be limited by an eccle-
siastical form of marriage, extrinsic in nature, under reasonable conditions.5 7
But the Fathers labored to make it clear that they were not touching upon the
question of the intrinsic matter or form of the sacrament, as it was highly
questionable whether even the Church had jurisdiction to nullify the effect of a
sacrament. 5 They were setting up a new extrinsic form: the impediment of
clandestinity. 59
The decree Tametsi of the Council of Trent ushered in a new era of Canon
Law. It put a formal end to the remnants of the empirical form of marriage that
still existed on the Continent.60 It introduced the externally cognizable juridical
form of marriage.61 In addition to the requirement of mutual consent, Tametsi
decreed that a marriage be celebrated infacie Ecclesiae and before two or three
witnesses. 62
Tametsi did not require a celebration before an active priest at all,6 3 and was
unclear as to whether the mutual consent was to be exchanged in the presence of
a priest. Mutual consent was required to be exchanged infacie Ecclesiae, literally
in front of the facade of the Church where the witnesses generally were
gathered. 64 Thereafter, the parties would move into the Church for Mass and
Holy Communion and a blessing by the priest-the actual marriage having al-
ready taken place outside.65 The priest could not and did not solemnize the
55. Id. at 305.
56. Id. at 299.
57. See Brown, supra note 24, at 127.
58. See 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 22.
59. Chatham, supra note 27.
60. Stein, supra note 5, at 274.
61. Brown, supra note 24, at 128.
62. See Chatham, supra note 27, at 300.
63. Id.
64. Stein, supra note 5, at 272.
65. Cahill, Historical Note on the Canon Law on Solemnized Marriages. 2 CATHI. LAW. 108,116
(1956) [hereinafter cited as CAHILL].
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marriage, so to speak. Only the couple could do this, due to the sacramental
connotations. 66
The authorities are sharply divided on the interpretation to be given the
phrase infacie Ecclesiae. Some contend that the words are not to be literally
construed, but rather are to be understood to mean in the presence of an eccles-
iastical authority, i.e., an authorized priest67 Under this interpretation, the
mutual consent must be exchanged in the actual presence of a priest and wit-
nesses, thereby eliminating the prospects of a valid "surprise marriage." But even
here, the priest did not play an active role, and so long as the consent was ex-
changed in his presence, his dissent could not affect the validity of the marriage.
The literal interpretation of infacie Ecclesiae, i.e., in front of the facade of the
Church, is plausible when considered in light of the then prevailing custom of
couples actually meeting in front of the Church to exchange consent before
witnesses and thereafter moving into the Church, where the priest would be
waiting to bless them. 6
Hence, there were at least two ways in which the decree Tanetsi, while tech-
nically complied with, could be reduced to mockery. In the first instance, the
parties would exchange consent infacie Ecclesiae before both priest and wit-
nesses, regardless of whether or not the priest approved or actually protested.
The marriage was still valid. In the second instance, the couple would exchange
consent infacie Ecclesiae in front of the facade of the Church and thereafter go
inside and inform the priest that they were married. These were the so called
"surprise marriages."69
ENGLAND AFTER THE COUNCIL OF TRENT
The decree Tametsi was intended to embrace all persons in the Western
World, whether or not they were actually members of the Church. The reasoning
behind such an essay was that inasmuch as the greater part of the Western World
was Catholic, there was good hope that all others might eventually be brought
under the fold of one shepherd.7 0
However, such grandiose dreams of empire were not to be realized, as this was
the beginning of the Modern Era and the rise of the nation states. It was simply
too late in the day to arrest the tide of dissidents then appearing at all levels
of society. Luther had spoken, Geneva had received Calvin, Savonarola had
been burned at the stake, and the dynastic rivalries and power struggles that
threatened the existence of the newly established orders throughout the Con-
tinent had all but started. The seeds had been planted for the struggles among the
claimants to the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and Bourbon thrones.
66. See 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 22-23.
67. See Brown, supra note 24, at 128.
68. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
69. See 2 J. SCIOULER, supra note 2, § 1194 for an exhausting comment on the endless debate as
to what function, if any, the priest actually served under Tametsi.
70. Cahill, supra note 65, at 117.
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This great council, which was intended to secure the union of Chris-
tendom under the See of Rome, really contributed to intensifying
the separatist forces then at work; and from it onwards one can no
longer speak of a general marriage law even for Western Europe.
Custom and legislation took thence forward different courses, not only
as between Protestant and Roman Catholic nations, but even differ-
ent Protestant nations, there being no common ecclesiastical authority
which Protestant States recognized. 71
The initial problem with Tametsi was that it was not selfexecuting.
The Council, fearful lest the immediate universal application of the law
might do more harm than good by multiplying invalid marriages, par-
ticularly in Protestant localities, decreed that its provisions should not
come into force ... 12 [until the priests of the local parishes] as soon as
possible see to it that this decree be published and explained to the
people in all the parish churches of their dioceses, and that this be done
very often during the First year and after that as often as they deem it
advisable ... This decree shall begin to take effect in every parish at the
expiration of thirty days, to be reckonedfrom the day of its first publi-
cation in that diocese.73
The upshot of this was that inasmuch as publication was withheld in Protes-
tant areas, Tametsi remained inoperative in large tracts of Europe. Hence, in
those dioceses wherein publication was not had, the Canon Law remained un-
changed and the onlyjuridically required formality was the old inward exchange
of mutual consent. In these dioceses clandestine marriages were still valid mar-
riages.
Meanwhile, in Elizabethan England, Pope Pius IV had requested that the
decree be introduced, but as the Reformation in England was then in full swing,
neither the Crown nor the English ecclesiastics dared publish Tametsi.74 Accord-
ingly, the authorities are in agreement that there never was a publication of
Tametsi in England. 75 The law governing marriage in England, then, was not
affected by the decree Tametsi of the Council of Trent.76 As there was still no
civil legislation concerning marriage, and there would be none until Lord Hard-
wicke's Act in 1753, infra, the common law of England, as respects marriages,
remained the ecclesiastical Canon Law, unaffected by Tametsi. The sole juridi-
cal formality remained that of an inward exchange of mutual consent. Clandes-
tine marriages continued to be valid marriages in England. The common law
71. 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 28.
72. Barry, supra note 6, at 163.
73. Chatham, supra note 27, at 301 (emphasis added).
74. 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 28.
75. Cahill, supra note 65, at 114. See also Hodson, Common Law Marriage, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 205, 208 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hodson]; Stein, supra note 5, at 274; J. LONG, supra note 29,
§ 56.
76. See id.
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courts did not pronounce on the validity of a marriage per se, as this remained
the exclusive province of the ecclesiastical courts, but rather limited their juris-
diction to the civil incidents of marriage, as previously enunciated.
But there was a caveat to this. The ecclesiastical authorities generally held that
if Tametsi had been promulgated in the parish wherein a person had domicile,
then although that person thereafter moved to a parish where the decree had not
been promulgated, said person nevertheless remained bound by the decree. 77
Technically speaking, those persons domiciled in dioceses on the Continent
wherein Tametsi had been promulgated, were still bound thereto notwithstand-
ing their subsequent migration to England, although it is doubtful that any
ecclesiastical authority in England was ever aware of such an isolated instance.
And, assuming arguendo it were so aware, it is even more doubtful that such
authority would, in view of the strong inroads made by the Reformation, have
invalidated or censured such a marriage. It is speculative whether the children of
such "star-crossed" emigrants were also bound by Tametsi.
THE MIGRATION FROM ENGLAND
TO NORTH CAROLINA: 1629-1776
In 1629, King Charles I of England granted his attorney general, Sir Robert
Heath, the southern part of the English claim in North America. The claim was
first made in 1497 on the basis of John Cabot's voyage. Heath made no attempts
at settlement and the first permanent white settlers came to the Carolinas from
Virginia about 1660.78
In 1663 King Charles II gave a charter for Carolina to eight Englishmen as
proprietors of the colony. The grant of land included all of the territory between
Virginia and Spanish Florida, and westward to the "south seas. '79 The northern
section of this grant, which later became known as North Carolina, was settled
by the pioneers from Virginia, the survivors and descendants of the early English
settlements in the New World. Virginia was at that time a royal colony ruled
directly by the Crown. 80
The threshold consideration then, is what law respecting marriage formal-
ities, if any, did these early English settlers bring with them to North Carolina?
As has already been shown, the common law of England as respects formalities
of marriage was at this time the ecclesiastical Canon Law, unaffected by
Tametsi, and having as its sole juridical requirement the inward exchange of
mutual consent. This i s the only "law" of marriage the English settlers could have
brought with them to North Carolina. Tametsi, although published in a few
areas in the United States, was published at a much later date, and even then,
77. Chatham, supra note 27, at 301.
78. 13 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, North Carolina 380 (1960).
79. L. P. TODD & M. CURTI, RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION 41 (1961).
80. Id. at 23.
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only in a few isolated regions, none of which were in North Carolina or any of the
thirteen original colonies for that matter.8
Did the English settlers of North Carolina bring over with them the English
common law of marriage, the ecclesiastical Canon Law unaffected by Tametsi?
Later cases and authorities have generally held that English subjects were under-
stood to have taken with them abroad to an English colony so much of the Com-
mon Law as was applicable to their present situation. 82 As a representative case,
see Wolfenden v. Wolfenden 83 wherein two British subjects were held to have
taken with them to a British Colony so much of the common law as was appli-
cable to their present situation, which was found to be enough to constitute a
valid common law marriage between them.
Inasmuch as the juridical requirements of the English common law were re-
stricted to an inward exchange of mutual consent, there could not have been
much difficulty in transporting such a formality to the colony of North Carolina.
It is safe to conclude that the English common law, as respects marriage formali-
ties, was brought over in its entirety. As such a juridical requirement was almost
impossible to verify empirically, clandestine marriages, whether valid or not,
must have flourished in the early proprietary and colonial period.
However, and this is generally seen to be the case with colonies, an indigenous
law early attempts to make its appearance on the scene, in the process thereby
striving to modify the common law of the founding settlers. The evidence indi-
cates that several of the early American proprietary and colonial legislatures
made every effort to ensure that certain outwardly cognizable formalities would
be complied with, and North Carolina was no exception. 84
With the aid of John Locke, a young English philosopher, the proprietors, the
eight English noblemen, drew up a Constitution for North Carolina. This Con-
stitution, dated 1669, provided that "No marriage shall be lawful, whatever con-
tract and ceremony they have used till both the parties mutually own it, before
the register of the place where they were married." 85 This Constitution was un-
realistic in several respects and was doomed from its inception. As far as the
marriage provisions were concerned, since there were few, if any, registers to go
to at that time, the constitutional formality was almost completely ignored. 86
And furthermore, a close reading of the Constitution reveals that the common
law formality of solemnization was not altered at all. All that was now required
was an ex postfacto registration. The English common law's sole requirement of
an inward exchange of mutual consent was not affected by this Constitution.
81. Cahill, supra note 65, at 114. Publication was made in the Ecclesiastical Province of Sante
Fe, excluding the northern part of the territory of Colorado; in the entire Province of New Orleans;
in the Province of San Francisco and, with some exceptions, in the territory of Utah; in the Diocese of
Vincennes, Indiana; in the City of St. Louis and in a few towns within that diocese; in several towns
in the present Diocese of Belleville, Illinois. In the rest of the country, it was never published.
82. Hodson, supra note 75, at 210.
83. [1945] 2 All E.R. 539: [1946] P. 61; 115 L.J.P. I; 173 L.T. 301; 62 T.L.R. 10.
84. Stein, supra note 5, at 276.
85. XXV THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 132-33.
86. Semonche, Common Law Marriage in North Carolina. 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 320, 324
(1965).
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Same did not purport to constitute a marriage but merely to give effect to an al-
ready existing marriage, however entered. The common law of marriage, the
English ecclesiastical Canon Law, was then, in 1669, the same in England as in
North Carolina.
With the failure of Locke's Constitution, the Carolinas divided into North and
South, the North also being known as the Albemarle Sound Colony. This was in
late 1669 and early 1670.87
An early act of the Albemarle Assembly, 1669, provided that an exchange of
vows before the Governor or a Councilman and three or four witnesses, and a
deposit of a certificate in the Secretary's Office constituted a valid marriage. 88
Again, this did not alter the English common law of the pioneer settlers, for at
least four reasons. First, with the growth of the colony, access to the Governor or
to a Councilman became impossible and the statute was largely ignored. Sec-
ond, Quaker colonists who married according to their own religious rites which
differed from the statute, were not excepted by the statute, and yet such mar-
riages were permitted by the Assembly, thereby rendering the statute merely
directory. Third, the statute only provided another scheme for getting married.
It did not repeal the English common law. 89 And lastly, the statute in no sense
purported to be exclusive.
Of course this is not to say that fornication and adultery flourised in North
Carolina. Despite the continuing viability and exclusivity of the English com-
mon law of marriage, prosecutions could be and were instituted when scandal-
ous conduct was viewed as a threat to the colony's welfare. 90 The minutes of the
early colonial courts indicate that prosecutions were usually confined to those
cases wherein a woman had had a child out of wedlock or in which the parties
were living together in adultery. 9'
The act of 1715, "An Act For Establishing The Church & Appointing Select
Vestrys," 92 is also regarded as not having repealed the English common law of
marriage. That act required a marriage to be performed, after the procurance of
a valid license and triple publication of banns, by a minister of the Church of
England, or a Justice of the Peace if there was no such minister available. In
addition, a penalty of five pounds was to be assessed for violations of the act. Yet
even these strong words were not considered to have affected the vitality of the
common law, for several reasons. First, the act was left to the Church of England
to enforce, and as this body was at that time almost totally nonexistent in North
Carolina, there was no enforcement and the statute was ignored. Second, the
statute also- contained a provision which flew in the face of the new "require-
ments," to wit, a provision which allowed couples 12 months to establish that
they were married without questioning how such a marriage was entered. Third,
87. Id. at 325.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 326-27.
90. Id. See also N.C. General Court Minutes, 1695-1703, February 25, 1695, folio 25; N.C. Gen-
eral Court Minutes, 1695-1712, March 28, 1701, folios 134-135.
91. Id.
92. XXIII RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA. 6-10.
15
Powell: An Evolutionary Consideration of the Marriage Formalities of Lice
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1978
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LA W JOURNAL
nothing in the statute professed it to be exclusive, and fourth, there was no in-
validating clause for the common law.93 In addition, the legislature in 1715 af-
firmed, "That the laws of England are the laws of this Government, so far as they
are compatible with our Way of Living and Trade... The common Law is, and
shall be, in Force in this Government,"94 And, Col. William Byrd, in his 1728 ex-
pedition surveying the boundary line between Virginia and North Carolina, re-
marked, upon observing that although there were requests for his Chaplain to
baptize infants, there were no requests for his Chaplain to perform marriages:
"Marriage is reckon'd a lay contract in Carolina." 9
The acts of the colonial legislature thus were merely directory and did not
invalidate the common law of England which, identical to the ecclesiastical
Canon Law of England, had at that time the sole juridical requirement, empiri-
cally unenforceable, of a mere inward exchange of mutual consent. That the
intent of the legislatures was actually being frustrated is, at first glance, hardly
questionable. But, upon a consideration of the difficulties of enforcement, the
hardships of frontier living, the inaccessibility of the colonists to their Governor
and Councilmen, inadequate communications and transportation facilities, the
scarcity of justices of the peace and clergy of any denomination, the prepon-
derance of destitute and ignorant settlers, and in the light of the foregoing factors
the hardships which enforcement of the statute would have entailed (e.g.,
bastardy, annulment, etc.), it becomes extremely difficult to suppose that the
lawmakers ever intended by their acts to repeal the common law of England.
In any event, in 1729, shortly after North Carolina had ceased to be a pro-
prietorship and had become a royal colony, the Board of Trade declared the Act
of 1669 and the act of 1715 to be obsolete.96 From 1729 to 1741 then, there
existed no legislative pronouncements on marriage and the common law con-
tinued in full force.
The Act of 1741, 97 while expressly stating as its purpose the prevention of
clandestine and unlawful marriages, and containing provisions for licensure,
banns, solemnization by a minister of the Gospel or a justice of the peace and
penalities for noncompliance therewith, was also considered to be merely di-
rectory, as it did not purport to be exclusive, it failed to invalidate the common
law and was rarely, if at all, enforced. 98 In addition, various religious sects,
most notably the Quakers and Presbyterians, considered their religious rites for
marriage immune from any legislative interference. Accordingly, the Act of 1741
was amended in 176699 and again in 1778,100 expressly securing the already
claimed exclusive right of religious sects to their own marriage formalities.
93. See Semonche, supra note 86, at 330-31.
94. XXIII RECORDS OF NORTt CAROLINA, 39.
95. W. BYRD, HistorY of the Dividing Line, in THE WRITINGS OF COLONEL WILLIAM BYRD 63,
60 (J.S. Bassett ed. 1901).
96. Il RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 175-176.
97. XXIII RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 158.
98. See Semonche, supra note 86, at 334-36.
99. XXIII RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 672-673.
100. XXIV RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 997.
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Hence, the common law of England, the English ecclesiastical Canon Law, re-
mained intact throughout the entire proprietary and colonial period of North
Carolina. Although the common law was repealed in England by Lord Hard-
wicke's Act in 1753, infra, that act was on its face expressly made applicable to
England and Wales only' 0' and, as held by the courts and authorities, not to the
colonies. 112
It should also be noted that there is no indication of a bifurcation of civil and
ecclesiastical marriage jurisdiction in North Carolina, or in any of the colonies
for that matter. In those colonies which recognized a common law marriage, of
which North Carolina was one, the civil incidents of marriage were not sep-
arated from the validity of the marriage as had been the case in England. 03
DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLAND: 1563-1836
Meanwhile, in England the law of marriage continued to be the common law,
the ecclesiastical Canon Law as it existed unblemished by Tametsi, and re-
mained such until the passage of Lord Hardwicke's Act in 1753.104 Up until that
date the marriage law of England was administered exclusively by the ecclesiasti-
cal courts. These courts, applying the Canon Law of England, recognized con-
tracts of marriage per verba de praesenti and per verba defuturo cum copula.
This consensual basis had been the accepted Canon Law of England since the
twelfth century, when it was propounded by Peter Lombard. 105
Of course, the civil authorities had early on become quite unhappy with the
decisions of the ecclesiastical courts and their assumption of jurisdiction over the
civil incidents of marriage. 06 The civil authorities were not content with the ever
increasing incidence of clandestine marriages. Under the Canon Law it was
simply too easy to get married and almost impossible to prove the invalidity of
any given marriage. And in any event, the existing scheme precipitated an incid-
ence of lewd behavior far in excess of that desired for a pretentious society so
eager to commence its Victorian Age.
Accordingly, it was a desire to regularize cohabitation, to save the children of
such unions from the stigma of bastardy, to save the parents from the sin of
fornication and to make good the expectations of the parties at the time of their
consent-in short, a desire to destroy informal, consensual marriages-which
marked the end of the common law, the English ecclesiastical Canon Law,
regulation of marriage. These were essentially the identical reasons underlying
the decree Tametsi, 107 although as will be seen infra, the juridical force of Lord
Hardwicke's Act far surpassed that of Tametsi.
101. Lord Hardwicke's Act, 1753, 26 Geo. 2, c. 33 (1753) See also 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at
29; Andrews, supra note 21.
102. 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 58.
103. See J. LONG, supra note 29, § 57.
104. Lord Hardwicke's Act, 1753, 26 Geo. 2, c. 33 (1753).
105. See Hodson, supra note 75, at 206.
106. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
107. Andrews, supra note 21.
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Hence, the reform of English marriage law must date from the celebrated
Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753. In addition to the above underlying considera-
tions of the Act, the Parliament especially intended to prohibit the so called
"Fleet Marriages" which had become a national disgrace to England. The fol-
lowing exerpt perhaps best describes a most amusing scandal:
The Fleet Prison [London] was used for persons committed by Chan-
cery, Exchequer, Common Bench and the Ecclesiastical courts, and
was preeminently a debtor's prison. Within its precincts (the "Liberty of
the Fleet," which embraced a considerable area of lodgings outside the
prison proper) were housed innumerable disreputable parsons immun-
ized from the jurisdiction of the bishop. These inmates improved their
purses by solemnizing marriages without banns or licenses. One worthy
is said to have performed on an average of 6000 "services" a year. A con-
temporary states: "In walking along the street in my youth on the side
next to the prison, I have often been tempted by the question, Sir, will
you be pleased to walk in and be married? Along this most lawless space
was hung up the frequent sign of a male and a female hand cojoined,
with, Marriage performed within, written beneath. A dirty fellow in-
vited you in. The parson was seen walking before his shop: a squalid pro-
fligate figure, clad in a tattered plaid nightgown, with a fiery face and
ready to couple you for a dram of gin or a roll of tobacco." (cf 2 Yorke,
Life of Hardwick [1913] 58 et seq). 0 8
Effectively repealing the common law, Lord Hardwicke's Act provided an
exclusive civil form for valid marriages in England, to the express exclusion of
the Royal Family, Quakers and Jews. 10 9 For a marriage to be valid, it was now
necessary that there be a celebration in the church or public chapel of the parish
wherein the parties dwelt, unless elsewhere by special license, in the presence of
at least two witnesses and after the publication of banns for three consecutive
Sundays prior, unless specially dispensed therefrom. In addition there was a
licensure requirement. Penalties for violations included "transportation to some
of his Majesty's Plantations in America for the space of fourteen years, accord-
ing to the laws in force for transportation of felons."" 10
The Act, immediately criticized as unduly harsh, was strictly enforced. An in-
adequate number of witnesses or mere undue publication of banns, i.e., banns
with technical defects, was enough to invalidate the marriage. In addition, the
cases construing the Act consistently held that the "church or public chapel" in
the Act was the Established Church of England, the Anglican Church, and not a
108. M. G. PAULSEN, W. WADLINGTON & J. GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 78-79 (2d ed. 1974).
109. Lord Hardwicke's Act. 1753, 26 Geo. 2, c. 33 (1753).
110. hi.
I 11. 0. KOEGEL. supra note 8, at 34-36. Although some decisions early held that while the statute
was mandatory and not directory, "substantial compliance" therewith was all that was warranted by
the Act and technical deficiences would not invalidate an otherwise valid marriage. This was especi-
ally true in decisions construing the statutory requirements for publication of banns. See also notes
148-153 infra and accompanying text. Accord, Standen v. Standen, 170 Eng. Rep. 73 (N.P. 1791).
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church or public chapel of another denomination. "12 That latter injustice was not
remedied until the Marriage Act of 1836,' 13 infra, which permitted temporal
marriage by a registrar. The Act of 1836 in turn was revised by the Marriage Act
of 1949, infra.
The easing of restrictions by the Marriage Act of 1836 may be understood to
have been a Parliamentary impetus to the courts to invoke equity and common
sense in construing the marriage statutes. Accordingly, mere technical defici-
encies came to be waived by the courts. In Gompertz v. Kensit 14 the use of incor-
rect surnames and incorrect Christian names in the banns was held not to have
rendered the banns "undue" where there was a stated purpose of brevity and no
evidence of fraud. Likewise, in Dancer v. Dancer' 15 the incorrect listing of the
bride's name in the banns was held not to have rendered the banns "undue" in
view of the fact that there was no evidence of fraud and that a preponderance of
the witnesses had showed that the bride was not known by her true name at all,
but rather by another name. The leading case is Piers v. Piers1 6 wherein a mar-
riage celebrated in a private home was held valid, notwithstanding that there
was no evidence that a valid special license had ever been obtained. Lord Camp-
bell brushed aside the statutory requirements by reasoning that to hold other-
wise "you may be deciding that a woman is a concubine, and that the children
are bastards, upon a mere speculation, when in fact, contrary evidence may
afterwards be produced, when it is too late, to show that there was that in exist-
ence which would render the marriage valid."' 16A
Two further considerations of Lord Hardwick's Act deserve mention. In the
first place, a close reading of the Act indicates that a celebration in the presence
of a clergyman was not expressly mandated, but rather presumed. In view of the
requirements for licensure and banns, the issue is most probably academic. Sec-
ondly, in concession to the violent opposition in the Parliament, the Act was
made applicable to England and Wales only. Thus began the famous "runaway
marriages" to Gretna Green, a small town just within the borders of Scotland.
There, the common law, the English ecclesiastical Canon Law, was still in force
and Lord Hardwicke's Act was easily avoided." 7
The year 1753 then, officially marks the end of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
common law, the English ecclesiastical Canon Law, over marriage in England.
Henceforth, the formal validity of a marriage would be regulated by the
Parliament, and not the ecclesiastical authorities. Marriage was thereafter con-
sidered to be a civil matter.
112. 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 35.
113. Marriage Act of 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85 (1836).
114. [1872] L.R. 13 Eq. 369; 41 L.J. Ch. 382; 26 L.T. 95; 36 J.P. 548; 20 W.R. 313.
115. [1948] 2 All E.R. 731.
116. 9 Eng. Rep. 1118 (H.L. 1849).
116A. 9 Eng. Rep. at.
117. Anton and Francescakis, Modern Scots "Runaway Marriages, "3 JURID. REV. 253 (1958).
See also Dalrymple v. Dalrymple 161 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ecc. Adm. P & D. 1811) in which the common
law was held to be valid in Scotland and unaffected by Lord Hardwicke's Act.
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Before returning to North Carolina, a few words are in order concerning
Regina v. Millis." 8 Therein, in deciding the validity of an Irish marriage, to
which the common law, the English ecclesiastical Canon Law, still governed and
not Lord Hardwicke's Act, their Lordships, equally divided, held that the com-
mon law of England required that a marriage be celebrated in the presence of a
clergyman of the established church. That this decision was an inaccurate assess-
ment of the common law is manifested in the severe criticisms of the author-
ities11 9 and frequent disapproval of other courts. 20 Today, Regina v. Millis is
not considered an authority on the common law of marriage. While the debate
continues as to what constrained their Lordships to hold as they did, the follow-
ing exerpt is perhaps one of the better analyses:
The opinion that the presence of a priest was required by the common
law of marriage was based on a law of the reign of King Edmund made
in 940 to the effect that at the nuptials there shall be a mass priest who
shall by God's blessing bind their union to all posterity. This was fol-
lowed by a number of constitutions of bishops and archbishops to the
same effect including one of Archbishop Lan Franc in 1070. These con-
stitutions did not enact law and since Church and State were separated
by William I, the general canon law of Europe was recognized as pre-
vailing in England.12'
DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA: 1776-1976
The common law of England continued to be the marriage law of North
Carolina long after American independence was declared and North Carolina's
subsequent entry into the Union. This is indicated by early reported decisions.
Whitehead v. Clinch2 2 is generally understood to be the first decision tolerating
a common law marriage in North Carolina. In that case, which involved a
widow's petition for dower, the court, while holding that, "The rules of the
common law are never to be departed from but where the legislature have ex-
pressly directed it, or where it necessarily follows from what they have directed,"
chose to leave to the jury the question of whether or not there was a valid mar-
riage.
That case was followed by Felts v. Foster, 23 which involved title to a tract
of land in a will. Therein, the court again paved the way for recognition of a
118. 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (H.L. 1843).
119. J. LONG, supra note 29, § 56; 0. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 39; Semonche, supra note 86, at
321; Andrews, supra note 21, at 400.
120. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple 161 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ecc. Adm. P. & D. 1811) See also Beamish v.
Beamish II Eng. Rep. 735 (H.L. 186 1) which, while condemning Regina v. Millis, nevertheless felt
constrained to and did affirm Regina v. Millis. The effect of Regina v. Millis in American courts was
largely one of confusion, with the cases going both ways. As representative examples, see Estate of
Baldwin, 162 Cal. 471 (1912), holding that a ceremony was a prerequisite to a valid common law
marriage, and Hulett v. Cary, 66 Minn. 327 (1896), noting that Regina v. Millis was incorrectly
decided. There are no reported North Carolina decisions in point.
121. Hodson, supra note 75, at 209. See also notes 30, 31 and 39 and accompanying text.
122. 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 3 (Super. Ct. 1797),
123. I N.C. (Tay.) 164 (Super. Ct. 1799).
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common law marriage by sending the issue to the jury, instructing them that they
had the power to find that a common law marriage existed and was valid from
the evidence of cohabitation as husband and wife, and the subsequent birth of
children.
Likewise in Weaver v. Cr'er & Moore, 124 involving trover forcattle, the court
instructed the jury that it must find a common law marriage from proof of co-
habitation as husband and wife, "I apprehend that the law was correctly stated;
that general reputation and cohabitation are evidence of a marriage." And State
v. Robbins, 125 while holding that a marriage without a license was illegal, also
held that such a marriage was not necessarily invalid.
The statutory scheme for marriage, although slightly altered in 1820 and
1838,126 remained essentially that of the 1778 legislation, 27 i.e., merely directory.
It was not until the Marriage Act of 1872,121 infra, that the common law was
effectively repealed and replaced by an exclusive statutory scheme, as the con-
struing cases were to so hold, infra.
However, prior to 1872, there were a few isolated cases which held the 1778
legislation to be exclusive. As a representative example, see State v. Samuel, 29
wherein it was held that there could be no common law marriage and that the
statutory scheme was the exclusive form for effectuating a valid marriage. The
reasoning of the court in this case is particularly interesting in that it does not
focus on the institution of marriage or on the traditional reasons for repealing
clandestine marriages (such as those underlying Tametsi and Lord Hardwicke's
Act1 30), but instead concerns itself solely with the institution of slavery. Briefly,
in State v. Samuel a slave was charged with murder. The key witness was a
woman with whom he had cohabited for ten years. In his defense, the slave con-
tended that the woman was his common law wife and therefore could not be
called to testify. In rejecting the defense of a common law marriage, the court
stated that the recognition of a common law marriage would undermine the
stability of the institution of slavery upon which the economy of the South rested
and that, moreover, a slave was considered "married" only for the duration of his
master's sufferance.
Such isolated cases have not been considered persuasive authority as both the
facts and holdings more often than not have rested upon considerations of
property rights, such as slavery, and/ or the proof of an existing marriage, hence
falling short of a consideration of exactly what was required to constitute a mar-
riage ab initio. The cases which dealt with proof of marriage generally focused
upon ex post facto evidentiary matters such as cohabitation, holding out as hus-
band and wife, birth of children, and duration of relationship. They con-
sistently failed to consider the nature of the marriage act itself.
124. 12 N.C. (I Dev.) 337 (Super. Ct. 1827).
125. 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 23 (Sup. Ct. 1845).
126. Semonche, supra note 86, at 341.
127. See note 100 supra.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-1, 51-6.
129. 19 N.C. (I Dev. & Bat.) 177 (Sup. Ct. 1836).
130. See note 107 supra.
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The Marriage Act of 1872,131 while on its face failing to repeal the common
law and also failing to assert its exclusivity, has been construed by the courts,
nevertheless, to have such effect, and hence represents a turning point in the
marriage law of North Carolina. The leading case is State v. Wilson, 132 in which
the court held the statutory provisions for an exchange of consent in the presence
of a minister (of any denomination) or ajustice of the peace, a declaration by the
minister or justice of the peace to the effect that the parties were husband and
wife, and a procurement of a license prior to the ceremony to be mandatory and
not directory. 3 3 The court said: "Consent is essential to marriage, but it is not
the only essential.... In this state it must be acknowledged in the manner and
before some person prescribed by the section of the Code. ... There is no such
thing as marriage simply by consent in this State. "33A
The present day statutory provisions for solemnization are the same as those
which appeared in the 1872 legislation. Briefly, the following is required:
1. procurance of a valid license
2. consent of the parties in the presence of each other and in the presence
of an ordained minister of any faith or a justice of the peace
3. a declaration by the minister or justice of the peace to the effect that the
parties are now husband and wife
In addition, the statute expressly exempts marriages performed pursuant to the
rites of Quakers and Baha'. Notice how this differs from the common law.
Whereas prior to the statute, the common law, the English ecclesiastical Canon
Law, require&merely an inward exchange of mutual consent, now that consent
must be outward and made in the presence of a designated official. Furthermore,
the designated official is required to take an active and affirmative role in the
ceremony, hence leaving no leeway for "surprise marriages" or "dissent-
ing marriages" as was possible under Tametsi. 134
With respect to licensure, the 1872 legislation merely prescribed that no
ceremony was to be performed prior to the officiating person's receipt of a
license. However, this requirement was merely directory as the courts early
held. Failure to procure a license to marry would not in itself invalidate an other-
wise valid marriage. 35
In addition, section 51-7 of the original statute merely imposed, as a penalty
for violations of the licensure requirement, a fine on the minister or officer.
The licensure provisions are essentially the same today as in 1872, although a
1967 amendment imposed, for the first time, the additional requirement of two
witnesses to the marriage ceremony. 36 Whether this provision is mandatory or
directory remains to be seen.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-1, 51-6.
132. 121 N.C. 650, 28 S.E. 416 (1897).
133. Accord, State v. Melton, 120 N.C. 591,26 S.E. 933 (1897); State v. Parker, 106 N.C. 711, I!
S.E. 517 (1890).
133A. 121 N.C. at 655, 28 S.E. at 420 (emphasis added).
134. See note 69 supra.
135. Wooley v. Bruton, 184 N.C. 438, 114 S.E. 628 (1922); Maggett v. Roberts, 112 N.C. 71, 16
S.E. 919 (1893); State v. Parker, 106 N.C. 711, 11 S.E. 517 (1890).
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DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLAND: 1836-1976
In the meantime, the marriage law of England remained essentially that of the
Marriage Act of 1836 37 until it was overhauled and revised by the Marriage Act
of 1949,138 which, with minor revisions, has continued to be the law today.
Briefly, the present Act prescribes two general avenues for effectuating a valid
marriage in England. The first avenue is a marriage pursuant to the rites of the
Church of England. 39 There are four ways for a couple to be married in that
fashion:
1. after due publication of banns
2. by special licensure of the Archbishop of Canterbury
3. by common license granted by an ecclesiastical authority
4. by license issued by a superintendent registrar 40
Sections 5 thru 25 of the Act expressly detail what is required in each of the
four subdivisions above (e.g., place, time and manner of publication of banns,
licensing provisions, etc.). In addition, all marriages solemnized according to the
rites of the Church of England must be so solemnized in the presence of two or
more witnesses. 141
The second avenue for effectuating a valid marriage is a marriage performed
pursuant to the superintendent registrar's certificate.142 There exist five ways to
be married under this scheme:
1. in a registered building according to the form and ceremony as the parties
so wish (e.g.; a Roman Catholic service)
2. in the office of the superintendent registrar
3. pursuant to Quaker rites
4. pursuant to Jewish rites
5. according to the rites of the Church of England. 143
Sections 26 thru 46 extensively detail the requirements for a marriage via the
superintendent registrar's certificate, with or without a license (e.g., provisions
for notice, licensure, registry of buildings and persons authorized to solemnize).
Subdivisions 1 and 2 above expressly require two witnesses, words of present
intent, consent of the officiating authority and the presence of the officiating
authority. 144
Hence in England, as in North Carolina, from the passing of Lord Hard-
wicke's Act in 1753, the form of the solemnization has been an outward expres-
sion of consent by the couple in the presence of a designated official. And, in
England too, such designated official plays an affirmative role in the marriage
136. N.C. GEN STAT. § 51-6.
137. Marriage Act of 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85 (1836).
138. Marriage Act of 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c 76 (1949).
139. Id. §§ 5-25.
140. Id. § 5.
141. Id. § 22.
142. Id. §§ 26-46.
143. Id. § 26.
144. Id. §§ 44-45.
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ceremony. Sections 8, 16 and 29, among others, of the Marriage Act of 1949 ex-
pressly vest discretion in the designated official to refuse to perform the mar-
riage ceremony if requisite formalities have not been met. The couple cannot
"marry themselves" so to speak, as was possible at common law and, on the
Continent, in the "surprise marriages" and "dissenting marriages" of Tametsi.
And with respect to licensure, English courts, like the North Carolina courts,
have consistently held statutory licensure provisions to be merely directory and
not mandatory.
Generally speaking, English courts have long been constrained to a strong
presumption in favor of the validity of a marriage. For example, buildings
wherein a marriage is performed are presumed to be properly licensed, and an
English court and jury will so presume in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary. 145 As a general rule, per Spivack v. Spivack:146 "In civil cases, where there
is evidence of the fact of a ceremony of marriage, followed by cohabitation of the
parties, everything necessary for the validity of the marriage will be presumed in
the absence of decisive evidence to the contrary, even though it may be necessary
to presume the grant of a special license, etc. The burden of impeaching a mar-
riage lies on the impeaching party."
Equity is consistently invoked in interpreting the statutory requirements in
those fact situations wherein application of the letter of the law would otherwise
defeat the spirit. This is particularly so in many of the so called "banns cases"
wherein there is an allegation of "undue publication" of banns, contrary to the
statute. These cases often involve a "change of heart" whereby one spouse seizes
upon a technical defect in the banns, a defect of which the other spouse is ordi-
narily unaware and often of which the impeaching spouse was unaware at the
time of the marriage.
The cases have long held that no particular form of words in the banns need be
employed and that the words set forth in the statute are merely directory. They
need not be copied in verbatim.147
Inasmuch as the object of the publication of banns is to notify the world
generally, 4 to awaken the vigilance of parents, guardians and other con-
cerned citizenry, 49 a marriage solemnized after publication of banns, allegedly
"undue" due to the omission of a few Christian names for the sake of brevity, is
not a null and void marriage unless there is evidence that both parties "know-
ingly and willingly" concurred in such "undue" publication. 5 0
Similar results have obtained where the allegation is that a party is known to
others not by his Christian name but by another, the latter being the one inserted
in the banns and not the former. 51
145. See, e.g., R. v. Cresswell (1876), I Q.B. 446 and Sichel v. Lambert, 143 Eng. Rep. 992 (C. P.
1864).
146. Spivack v. Spivack, [1930] All E.R. Rep. 133.
147. See, e.g.. Standen v. Standen 170 Eng. Rep. 73 (N.P. 1791).
148. See, e.g., Frankland v. Nicholson 105 Eng. Rep. 607 (K.B. 1805).
149. See, e.g., Wakefield v. MacKay, 161 Eng. Rep. 593 (1807).
150. Gompertz v. Kensit, L.R. 13 Eq. 369 (1872).
151. See. e.g., Wyatt v. Henry 161 Eng. Rep. 720 (1817).
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In all of these cases it cannot be said that the object of the publication was
frustrated, as all concerned persons knew exactly the persons named in the
banns. Indeed, per Wright v. Elwood,152
[l]n all cases of this description, it is the duty of the court to be extremely
cautious in pronouncing a marriage, solemnized between two parties,
null and void, and to examine the whole of the evidence produced in
proof of the nullity with great vigilance and jealousy, because, in these
cases, opportunities are offered to parties to practice fraud and col-
lusion; and this is the more necessary where the party, whose interests
are apparently affected, and whose object it is to uphold the marriage
endeavoured to be set aside, seems to have afforded every facility to the
other party. Where the party before the Court, whose interests are
affected, abandons his cause, the Court would be inclined to withhold
its interposition for the protection of such a party; but where .... the
interests of third parties and the public are concerned, it is a duty
incumbent on the Court to be upon its guard against surprise.
In cases concerning licensure, both in England and North Carolina, the vali-
dity of same has been held not to depend on the merits of the descriptions con-
tained therein. Such a license is still a valid one and does not, in and of itself,
affect the status of the marriage. 153 While not void by mere description, a license
obtained for one person with the intention that it be used for another is most
likely a void license and ditto for the marriage.154
Equity is also to be found on the other side of the altar. Taking a practical
view of the matter, the court in Hawke v. Corri'55 observed that:
It seems to be a generally accredited opinion that, if a marriage is had by
the ministration of a person in the Church who is ostensibly in holy
orders, and is not known or suspected by the parties to be otherwise,
such marriage shall be supported. Parties who come to be married are
not expected to ask for a sight of the minister's letters of orders, and if
they saw them could not be expected to inquire into their authenticity.
CONCLUSION
This then, is a general outline of the evolution of the contemporary statutory
scheme for licensure and solemnization of marriage in England and North Caro-
lina. Whether such pronouncements effectively deal with their purported objec-
tivesl56 has been and will continue to be a subject of endless dispute. Negatively
viewed, a licensing procedure can hardly be an entirely effective enforcement
152. 163 E. R. 231, 233 (1837); previous proceedings 163 Eng. Rep. 17 (1835); 162 Eng. Rep. 969
(1829).
153. Wooley v. Bruton, 184 N.C. 438, 114 S.E. 628 (1922); Maggett v. Roberts, 112 N.C. 71, 16
S.E. 919 (1893); Clowes v. Jones. 163 Eng. Rep. 697 (1842).
154. See. e.g., Lane v. Goodwin, 114 Eng. Rep. 935 (Q.B. 1843).
155. 161 Eng. Rep. 743, 746 (1820).
156. See notes 56 and 107 supra and accompanying text.
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device. A licensing official cannot be expected to verify at the time of application
the parties' compliance with some of the very complex legislative requirements.
For example, an applicant may believe a prior divorce to be valid, and the clerk
is in no position to disbelieve. 57 In addition, the decisions of subsequent suits in
equity for bigamy, adultery, bastardy and intestate succession leave no room to
suppose otherwise than that marriage is more often than not recognized as a
natural right which existed before the statutes, that it is favored by the law, and
is to be protected rather than discouraged. 51
Of course the other side of the argument, i.e., the affirmative view of licensure
requirements, is that taken by, among others, the Royal Commission on Mar-
riage'and Divorce, noting the ease with which a marriage can be entered as a
factor going "far to explain why so many marriages are predisposed to break
down under the first sign of serious strain."' 59 Indeed, many of the witnesses
before the Commission urged amendment of the marriage laws so as to discour-
age hasty and ill-considered marriages.
Considered in pari materia, solemnization prescriptions evince analogous dis-
putes. While the cases have continually construed the pertinent statutory
language to be merely directory, even where held to be mandatory, the courts
have found "substantial compliance" therewith in order to protect the innocent
spouse from the stigma of bigamy or adultery, to legitimize the issue of ques-
tionable unions and to preserve an equitable devolution of property.
Other cases have invoked the statutes to justly dispose of sham unions which so
offended the mores of the community to be at an impermissible degree of vari-
ance with the accepted social order.
Inasmuch as such controversies precipitate no prospects for resolution and
there seemingly always will exist exceptions to every rule, it must necessarily be
admitted that both sides present merits which do not escape judicial/legislative
scrutiny and which partake of judicial/legislative approval. In short, both the
pros and cons for statutory formalities of licensure and solemnization evince a
societal interest which is distinctively pro marriage-hence the presumptions in
favor of the validity of a given marriage. The burden of impeachment rests upon
the impeaching party. 160
The unpopularity of the common law marriage may be said to have arisen
from the fact that we are living in an increasingly status conscious society. Com-
pulsory elements in marriage are on the rise. The influence of institutional mar-
riage is heavily noticeable. The label of common law marriage does not fit well
in these newer social patterns. The rugged individualism of the American
colonial days, which favored the preservation of the common law marriage in
North Carolina, is gone. Likewise in England, the decline of the landed aristo-
cracy, the rise of an Empire and the gradual recession to Commonwealth status
157. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 43, at 171.
158. J. LONG, supra note 29, at 101.
159. ROYAL COMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, REP. 1951-1955, CMD. No. 9678, 330
(1956) quoted in C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 43, at 236.
160. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
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of a second rate power lend credulence to a craving for greater certainty in the
law. 161 The stature of the family has diminished in the highly organized industrial
societies of England and North Carolina. 62 The lord of the manor and the
master of the plantation have both given in to parens patriae, leaving a void
which could only be filled by society via the machinery of its legislature and
courts. This is strikingly analogous to the disruption of Christian unity in the
1500's which the Fathers of the Council of Trent, the sole unifying force in the
Western World, likewise sought to ameliorate via the pronouncement of Canons
and the decrees of the ecclesiastical courts.
The trend away from the common law marriage may be briefly categorized as
follows. First, a common law marriage is recognized. This is evinced in the early
North Carolina cases and in the English cases prior to 1753. Second, although a
common law marriage is valid, some public recognition is desirable. This has
been seen in North Carolina in the acts of the proprietary and colonial legisla-
tures, which were held to be merely directory. And in England, this is seen in the
early bifurcation of the courts and the censures of the authorities. Third, a
genuine controversy exists. This is reflected in the isolated North Carolina cases
such as State v. Samuel, supra, which held the statute to be exclusive, and in
England, in the opinion of the ill-advised Lords in Regina v. Millis, supra. The
fourth and last stage is the progressive breakdown of the common law marriage,
culminating in North Carolina in the Marriage Act of 1872 and State v. Wilson,
supra, and in England, in Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753.
A common law marriage is found to exist in those societies wherein legal and
social orders are yet to be established or are newly established but have yet to
assert themselves. This was the case in colonial North Carolina and medieval
England. The transition to a statutory scheme accompanied the gradual demise
of the family stature as the society changed. In North Carolina the frontiers
vanished westward from the coast, and in England, northward from Canter-
bury. The industrial revolution came, and women were emancipated. The
growth in population and technology fostered the beginnings of a transfer of
wealth and power to the proletariat, and a middle class thereby emerged. As
centralization was critical to the stability of the legal and social orders of a
civilized society, the incidents of common law life one by one were assumed by
the legislature and Parliament, marriage being no exception. The voice of the
family was hushed, as a preponderance of discordant views could only serve
but to wreak havoc upon the grandiose dreams of Manifest Destiny and Empire.
Accordingly; citizens and subjects appeared on the scene, the plurality directing
the everyday developments of the particular and leaving the latter no choice but
to bequeath to future generations a subconscious anxiety for a compulsive
ritual, which has today become firmly embedded in the heritage of North Caro-
lina and England.
161. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends in Fami Organiza-
tion, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 88, 98 (1960).
162. See Semonche, supra note 86, at 323.
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Hence, today it is a truism recognized by the public and supposedly well in-
grained in the law that while marriage is a contract between two persons, it is
something more. It is also a status, vitally affecting the public welfare, and as a
social institution, subject to regulation by public authority. The state and crown
are parties in interest to every marriage contract, and the preservation of the
marital relation is deemed essential to the public welfare. 1
63
163. Williams, Solemnization of Marriages: The Common Law Marriage-Never Solemn and
No Longer Common-Will It Remain Law?. 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 447 (1959).
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